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THE ANTI-CLAIMS CLAUSE: EXTINGUISHING
A CONTRACTOR REMEDY
The so-called Anti-Claims Changes clause, introduced by the Navy
in 1970,1 presently is being considered by the Armed Services Procure-
ment Regulations (ASPR) Committee for permanent incorporation into
the regulations governing all Department of Defense procurement.2
Although officially denominated a Contractor's Identification of Changes
clause s in the form under consideration by the Committee,4 it is charac-
terized by the public contracts community as a further extension of the
Government policy of shifting risks to contractors. Many in the
defense industry regard the clause not as the mere facilitation of change
identification, but rather as the virtual elimination of certain types of
contractor claims allowable under the Changes clause of the Stand-
ard Government Supply Contract.,
The purpose of this Note is to determine how the Anti-Claims clause
will increase the contractor's risk and the extent to which it will deny
him remedies presently available under the standard Changes clause.
ALLOCATION OF RISK IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
The policy of reducing risks to the government in procurement con-
1. Navy Procurement Circular (NPC) No. 15 (March 1970) [hereinafter cited as
NPCI introduced a battery of contract provisions which the Navy termed "Anti-
Claims" clauses. This original Navy revision to the Standard "Changes" clause has been
used in Navy Procurement since that time.
2. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 1.100 et seq. [hereinafter cited as ASPR). Section 1.102 pro-
vides:
This subchapter shall apply to all purchases and contracts made by the
Department of Defense, ... , for the procurement of supplies and services
which obligate appropriated funds ....
ASPR is issued by the Assistant Secretary of Defense by direction of the Secretary
under the authority contained in chapter 137, Title 10 of the U.S.C. It establishes uniform
policies and procedures governing the procurement of supplies and services and has
the force and effect of law. See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963); G. L.
Christian & Associates v. United States, 320 F.2d 245 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 275
U.S. 954 (1964).
3. The proposed ASPR revision is reproduced in its entirety in Appendix B. This
revision was made available to the defense industry for comment.
4. NPC No. 15, supra note 1, referred to the proposed changes to ASPR as "Anti-
Claims" clauses, while NPC No. 18 (October 1970), which is a slight revision of NPC
No. 15, identified them as "claims identification and notice clauses."
5. ASPR 7-103.2. This Standard "Changes" clause is set forth in Appendix A.
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tracts was initiated during the Kennedy-McNamara administration 6
and now is sanctioned officially in ASPR itself.7
This policy has been implemented primarily by replacing cost-type
contracts (involving procurement by negotiation) with fixed-price con-
tracting (involving procurement by formal advertising)." Clearly,
fixed-price contracting, under which the contractor assumes full re-
sponsibility for performing within a stipulated price, produces difficulties
for the contractor even when employed in the procurement of techno-
logically simple products.' Thus it is not surprising that procurement
of technologically complex items through fixed-price contracts neces-
sarily involves far greater burdens for the contractor. For example, in
complex procurements, the risk of dealing with known or anticipated
unknowns as well as with what have been called "unanticipated un-
knowns" is thrown squarely upon the contractor.'0 Formerly, under the
cost-type contract this risk was mitigated because the contractor would
be reimbursed almost automatically for a wide variety of cost items
resulting from difficulties which neither party had anticipated prior to
its award. But under the fixed-price contractual setting, these same
items must be recouped through a cumbersome administrative claims
6. Vom Baur, Fifty Years of Government Contract Law, 29 FED. B. J. 305, 352 (1970).
7. ASPR 3-808.5(c), dealing with profit guidelines in procurement by negotiation
states:
This . . . reflects the policy- of the Department of Defense to shift the
-risk of contract costs to the fullest extent practicable to contractors and
to compensate them for the assumption of this risk.
The second phrase in this section would seem to have been overlooked, particularly
when one examines the profits of the defense industry as opposed to the profit
margins realized by the coimimercial sector of industry. The report of the Logistics
Management Institute prepared for the Department of Defense shows that the average
profit rate for the defense industry was 3.89 percent as compared to the 9.35 perdent
attained by the companies reported in the Federal Trade Commission/Securities &
Exchange Commission Durable Goods Group, and the 7.64 percent earned on com-
mercial business by the defense contractors themselves. FEaDm. CoimaAcrs REaoRTr,
No. 321, at A-12 (1970).
8. By 1968, over 75 *pprcent of defense contracts were fixed-price type. Drake,
Major DoD Procurements at War with Reality, 48 HARv. Bus. REv. 119, 123 (1970).
9. See Stotle-SantaFe-Bing, ASBCA No. 12893, 69-1 B.C.A. 7620; Penn State Coat &
Apron Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 6278, 61-1 B.C.A. 2912. Significantly, firm-fixed-price,
fixed-price-incentive, and price-competitive contracts produced the lowest profit rates
among the types of defense contracts employed by the Department of Defense (3.3
percent, 4.1 percent, and 2.0 percent respectively). Logistics Management Institute
report to the Department of Defense, Fnmu.L CoimfAcrs REPoRT, No. 321, at A-12.
10. Drak6, supra note 8, at 124.
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procedure" which involves contractor claims, identification, presenta-
tion, and negotiation.' 2
In conjunction with its reallocation of risk, the Government also
centralized and increased the direct role it plays in the administration
of contract performance.' 3 Contractors' plants bristle with Govern-
ment inspectors, officers, and administrators. However, because of the
emphasis on centralized contract administration, these on-the-scene
personnel, who are in the best position to guide the contractor, are
restricted in their decision-making power. They are particularly lim-
ited in their power to bind the Government. 14 Thus, the contractor
not only faces increased risk, but also confronts direct and pervasive
supervision of his contract by administrators from whom he cannot
elicit timely, meaningful decisions.
In addition to these difficulties, the contractor is faced with severe
supervision of his own procurement and subcontracting system,'5 and
with the profit-stifling effects of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act' 6 and
the Renegotiation Act.'7  One observer has described the contractor's
position as follows:
The critical link between the buyer . . . (the Government) and
the successful competitor is the procurement contract. A favored
concept for procuring.., and a preferred method of contracting
have developed over the past decade, which represent an overall
shift of the risk involved ...from Government to contractor.
11. ASPR 7-103.2; ASPR 7-103.12 "Disputes" outlines the procedure for resolving
disagreements involving questions of fact.
12. R. NASH & J. CIBINIC, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW 560 (1969).
18. Drake, supra note 8, at 123.
14. Vom Baur, supra note 6, at 354. See, e.g., International Aircraft Services, Inc,
ASBCA No. 8389, 65-1 B.C.A. t 4793.
15. ASPR 7-104.23 "Subcontracts" regulations require advance notice to the con-
tracting officer and his approval prior to the letting of any subcontracts or purchase
orders which exceed certain dollar limits.
16. Public Law No. 87-653 (1962) added a new paragraph, (10 U.S.C. 2306(f) (1970))
to the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. Its effect can be found in ASPR
7-104.29 which requires contractors to certify all cost and pricing data as accurate
and current. Should the contractor's data be in error, a price reduction is effected.
The price is reduced if overestimated due to an error in pricing data, but the price
is expressly prohibited from being increased if the contractor underestimated due to
an error in his pricing data.
17. ASPR 7-103.13 "Renegotiation" provides that "this contract is subject to the
Renegotiation Act of 1951 (50 U.S.C. App. 1211, et seq.). . . ." Moreover, the'contractor
is required to insert the "renegotiation" clause in all subcontracts. ASPR 7-103.13 (a).
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Industry should, of course, bear reasonable risk, but this shift has
now gone too far.'8
As noted earlier, the shift to fixed-price contracting has forced
contractors to resort to the claims procedure more frequently in re-
covering costs previously reimbursable under cost-type contracts.19
However, the already-limited vitality of this remedy will be reduced
even more if the Anti-Claims clause, currently under study, is adopted..
Before turning to the effect of the proposed Anti-Claims clause, it is
necessary to examine the operation of the Changes clause and the reme-
dies available thereunder.
THE CHANGES CLAUSE
The Changes clause (Appendix A) probably is the most impor-
tant clause in a Government contract. It provides the flexibility needed
to make alterations during performance. In this regard, the clause
embodies a significant departure from the commercial contract prin-
cipal of mutuality; by virtue of its provisions, the Government is en-
titled unilaterally to change the contract and to enforce its perform-
ance as changed. The contractor, of course, is compensated for any
increased burden, or if his work requirements are diminished, an adjust-
ment in price is negotiated.
Formal Change Orders
The Supply Contract Changes clause empowers the Government,
by means of the contracting officer's written order, to "make changes,
within the general scope of [the] contract, in any one or more of the
following: (i) drawings, designs, or specifications, ... ; (ii) method of
shipment or packing; and (iii) place of delivery." 20 When such a
change affects the cost or changes the time required for performance
of any part of the work under the contract, an equitable adjustment is
made in the price or delivery schedule or both.2' Moreover, the adjust-
ments are made "whether changed or not changed by any ... order." 2
18. Drake, supra note 8, at 121.
19. Megyeri, Navy "Anti-Claims" Clauses, 7 PuBLic CoNTRAcTs SECTIoN 14 (1971).
"The clauses are widely considered to be stopgaps designed to avoid congressional crin-
cism in the wake of huge claims and overruns experienced in recent Navy procurements."
20. ASPR 7-103.2.
21. Id.
22. Id. This section of the clause is an attempt to avoid the harsh 'Rice Doctrine,",
1972]
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The contractor is required to proceed with the work as changed, and
any disagreement over the extent of the equitable adjustment is to be
resolved under the Disputes clause of the contract."
This literal analysis of the Changes clause makes its operation appear
relatively simple. Such is not the case, however, and there are several
problem areas which require examination.
The Contracting Officer
The definition of the contracting officer is set forth in the contract:
The term 'Contracting Officer' means the person executing this
contract on behalf of the Government, and any other officer or
civilian employee who is a properly designated Contracting Offi-
cer; and the term includes, except as otherwise provided in this
contract, the authorized representative of a Contracting Officer
acting within the limits of his authority.
24
Since the contracting officer and his authorized representatives tech-
nically are the only contract administrators capable of setting the-
Changes clause in motion, it is incumbent upon the contractor to know
who is, in fact, authorized to issue binding change orders. The most
frequent problem area regarding authority to issue change orders exists
where there has been a long acquiescence in a course of conduct in
which persons other than authorized representatives have acted under
the Changes clause.28 In the same way that changes can be brought
about by implication,. an individual by his conduct or. presence may
become the authorized representative of the contracting officer.26 In
some instances changes ordered by unauthorized personnel are deemed
uhder which the contractor was entitled to recover only for the additional cost due
to the-changed work. If the change altered the cost of the remainder of the work,
usually in the form of a delay, the equitable adjustment would involve only a time
extension and not compensation. United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61 (1942).
.23. ASPR 7-103.12 "Disputes" provides for administrative appeal to the Secretary of
Defense (in the form of the Armed Services Contracts Appeal Board) when the con-
tractor disagrees with a final decision by the contracting officer.
24. ASPR 7-103.1 "Definitions".
25. See, e.g., Hayes International Corp., ASBCA No. 9750, 65-1 B.C.A. T 4767.
26. General Cas. Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 805, 81.2-13 (Ct. Cl. 1955): "It
would be inane indeed to suppose that the resident engineer was at the site for no
purpose. We believe . . .that the resident engineer was the authorized representative
of the contracting officer." See also Lillard's ASBCA No. 6630, 61-1 B.CA. 3053; and
Re'eves Instr. Co., ASBCA No. 11534, 68-2 B:CA. 7078.
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to be "ratified" by the contracting officer,27 especially where he has
actual or constructive knowledge of the actions.
Furthermore, the boards of contract appeal will impute to the Gov-
ernment knowledge of difficulties being encountered by the contractor.
This rationale is justified by the theory that a contracting officer's
representatives, who lack formal power to change the contract, never-
theless will inform him of such difficulties. 2s Failure to countermand
or deny the validity of actions taken by unauthorized personnel con-
stitutes ratification of their actions.
The Court of Claims generally is more liberal in construing the
authority of Government representatives and thus more liberal in
allowing recovery for orders issued by individuals other than the
contracting officer.29 In reversing the Armed Services Board of Con-
tract Appeals (ASBCA), the court stated in Centre Manufacturing Co.
v. United States.30
The board has not stated that the contracting officer can never
delegate his authority, since it is well known that he can so dele-
gate. Instead, the board has found that Rossi was a mere 'techni-
cal' representative acting in a 'noncontractual capacity.' This char-
acterization of Rossi's function is not supported by substantial
evidence....
The plain undisputed fact is that Rossi was sent to the plaintiff's
plant ... for the sole purpose of settling the problem involving
the surplus material and hydrostatic test failures . . . Liability for
the actions of a Government agent, who carried out exactly what
he was ordered to do, cannot be avoided by pointing to labels.8 '
"Within the Scope"
The Supply Contract Changes clause allows the contracting officer
to change the work within the "general scope" of the contract with
respect to drawings, designs, specifications, method of shipment or
packing, and place of delivery. 2 The Supreme Court has defined "gen-
eral scope" to include all matters "fairly and reasonably within the
contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered into."
27. Lox Equipment Co., ASBCA No. 8985, 64-1 B.CA. 4463.
28. Inet Power Co., NASABCA No. 566-23, 68-1 B.C.A. 7020.
29. Max Drill, Inc. v. United States, 427 F.2d 1233 (Ct. C1. 1970).
30. 392 E.2d 229 (Ct. C1. 1968).
31. Id. at 236.
32. ASPR 7-103.2.
33. Freund v. United States, 260 U.S. 60, 63 (1922).
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This definition, however, has been of little practical value, especially
in determining when a change is, in fact, beyond the scope of the con-
tract. In this regard, the Court of Claims has formulated the more
useful "cardinal change" doctrine 4 to determine "general scope" prob-
lems. The doctrine is described in Air-A-Plane Corp. v. United States"
as follows:
The basic standard ... is whether the modified job 'was essen-
tially the same work as the parties bargained for when the contract
was awarded.'.... [Tlhere is a cardinal change if the ordered de-
viations 'altered the nature of the thing to be constructed.' . . .
[T] he problem 'is a matter of degree varying from one contract to
another' and can be resolved only 'by considering the totality of
the change and this requires recourse to its magnitude as well as
its quality.' s6
Regardless of the definition used or how it is applied, the "scope"
problem is important. For example, if an ordered change is, in fact,
beyond the scope, it becomes a breach of contract and divests the
appeals boards of jurisdiction. The contractor thereafter is entitled to
an action for d amages. Theoretically, he also is allowed to cease work
immediately.38
Notice Requirement
The Supply Contract Changes clause places the burden upon the
contractor to assert his claim for an equitable adjustment after receiving
a fbrmal change order from the contracting officer. Normally, the
contractor must assert his claim within 30 days after receipt of the
order. 9 However, the contracting officer is empowered to waive this
requirement and may act upon any claim which is asserted prior to
final payment.40 Moreover, courts consistently require that the waiver
34. K ECO Industries, Inc. v. United States, 364 F.2d 838 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (per
curiam).
35. 408 F.2d 1030 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
36. 408 F.2d-at 1033.
37. Luria -Bros. v. United States, 369 F.2d 701 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Saddler v. United
States, 287 F.2d 411 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
38. The concdpt is rarely interposed "as a limitation upon the contracting officer's
right to order changes, because contractors are rarely opposed to the addition of sub-
stantial increments of work to their contracts." Spector, An Analysis of the Standard
"Changes" Clause, 25 FED. B. J. 177, 187 (1965).
39. ASPR 7-103.2.
40. Id.
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'be granted so long as the contracting officer's ability to evaluate the
claim has not been prejudiced.41
Having considered the formal operation of the Changes clause, a dis-
"cussion of the "constructive change" doctrine and its value to the con-
tractor as a contractual, admnustrative remedy follows.
CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE
The constructive change doctrine, now firmly established in Gov-
ernment contract law, in essence permits relief under the standard
Changes clause even though no formal change order has been issued.
A constructive change order, by its very nature, results from the con-
tractmg officer's failure to issue a formal change order when he should
have done so. The formal change order is directed by the contracting
officer on a standard form, clearly labeled as a change. By contrast, a
constructive change order arises from an informal action or inaction
.which has the effect of directing the contractor to perform additional
work.42 This conduct may be attributable to the contracting officer
*himself or to some other Government official acting on his behalf.43
The Anti-Claims clause itself may contain the best description of
what constitutes a constructive change:
[W] hen a contracting officer or other Government representa-
tive by conduct (written or oral communications, actions, or in-
actions) requires a contractor to perform work other than
[through a formal change order] .. ., such conduct may be the
basis for a claim by the contractor, as if a formal change had
been issued.44
The constructive change concept was developed by the boards of con-
tract appeal to serve two purposes. First, as a legal fiction4 5 it enables
- 41. H. L. Yoh Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 493 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Fletcher Aviation
Corp, ASBCA No. 7669 & 8542, 64-1 B.CA. 4192; E. W Bliss Co., ASBCA No. 9584,
65-1 B.C.A. 4610.
42. Sun Shtpbldg. & Drydock Co., ASBCA No. 11300, 68-1 B.C.A. 7054 (delay
in the delivery of government furnished equipment); Polan Industries, Inc, ASBCA
Nos. 4104-07, 58-2 B.C.A. 1982.
43. Szemco, Inc., ASBCA No. 9892, 65-1 B.C.A. 4535; Temco, Inc., ASBCA No.
9588, 65-1 B.C.A. 4822; Lox Equipment Co, ASBCA No. 8985, 1964 B.C.A. 4463.
44. Proposed Revision to ASPR (Appendix B).
45. The use of tus legal fiction has been approved by the Court of Claims. See
Midwest Spray & Coating v. United States, 389 F.2d 423 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Jack Stone Co.
v. United States, 344 F.2d 370 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
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the boards to maintain jurisdiction under the Disputes clause46 over
cases which otherwise would be the subject of breach actions.4 7 Essen-
tially, the boards ignore the breach of contract by the Government
and settle the claim administratively under the contract provisions. 48
The second purpose, and the most important in relation to the Anti-
Claims clause, is to prevent unjust enrichment of the Government at the
expense of a contractor who performs work beyond contractual re-
quirements but which is not formally added by a written change order.4
Elements of Constructive Change
It has been said that a constructive change must be composed of the
same "elements" that are present in a formal change order; the con-
tractor's performance requirements are enlarged as a result of direc-
tions, express or implied, of the contracting officer. This additional per-
formance is not volunteered? °
These "elements" have been further described by the Department
of Commerce Appeals Board as the "change" element and the "order"
element."' The "change" element exists if actual performance has
gone beyond the minimum required by the contract.5 2 The "order"
element must consist of more than mere advice, comments, suggestions,
or opinions of Government representatives; "[t] he Government's repre-
sentative, by his words or his deeds, must require the contractor to
perform work which is not a necessary part of his contract." r
Situations Giving Rise to Constmuctive Changes
The most problematic constructive change occurs when the con-
tracting officer expressly orders additional work but refuses to issue a
change order in the belief that his interpretation of the existing contract
46. Vom Baur, Constructive Change Orders, Government Contracts Briefing Paper
No. 65-5 (1965).
47. Cuneo, The Changes Clause in Federal Construction Contracts, 35 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 908, 918 (1967).
48. NASH & CIaMIc, supra note 12, at 523-24.
49. C. A. Logeman Co., ASBCA No. 5692, 61-2 B.C.A. 3232, at 16,753:
The contracting officer did not have the legal or moral right to hide
behind the contract provisions for written determinations and repudiate
the agreement he had entered into... when he knew that the contractor
had proceeded in good faith and incurred large' expense ....
50. Spector, supra note 38, at 179.
51. Industrial Research Associates, Inc, DCAB No. WVB-5, 68-1 B.C.A. 7069.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 32,686.
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requirements is valid.5 4 For example, in Lockheed-Georgia Co., Division
of Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,55 the ASBCA sustained the contractor's
claim for an equitable adjustment under the Changes clause when the
contracting officer directed him to provide a more expensive alternative
performance when other methods of compliance were available. The
Appeals Board said:
It developed that the operational restrictions of the single pump
were undesirable in the type of aircraft being developed and the
contractor proposed a product improvement change in order to
build a better aircraft. The contracting office ordered the change
and maintained that it was a contract requirement. However, by
his order, the contracting officer had deprived the contractor of
the alternative of pursuing the other, less expensive course avail-
able to him. The order... resulted in extra work, entitling the
contractor to an equitable .adjustment .... 56
A similar result was reached in Burtek, Inc.,5' in which the ASBCA
found that the contracting officer had erroneously required the instal-
lation of head sets in aircraft trainers, when the contract did not so
require. This erroneous decision constituted a change."
Another class of constructive changes involves defective or impos-
sible'specifications or *drawings in which the claim generally is for
work and effort expended in an attempt to comply. For example in
Wilkinson Mfg. Co.,59 a producer of detonator fuses was found to be
entitled to a cost reimbursement for changes resulting from two defec-
tive drawings, and in Drexel Dynamics Corp.60 the same result was
reached when the Government furnished a defective design and defec-
tive testing equipment.61
Another common situation giving rise to a constructive change oc-
curs when inteipretation of the plans or specifications by the Govern-
54. Hallicrafters Co., ASBCA No. 11450, 68-2 B.C.A. 7274; Kurz & Root Co.,
ASBCA Nos. 11436, 11698, 68-1 B.CA. 6916.
•5S .-ASBCA No. 11976, 69-2 B.C.A. 8005.". "
56. Id. at 37,208. See also Michael C. Avino, Inc., ASBCA No. 12888, 69-2 B.C.A.
8058.
-57. ASBCA Nos. 11710,11711, 67-1 B.C.A. 6374.
58. See also C.EI.R., Inc, ASBCA Nos. 10868, 10934, 66-2 B.C.A. 5964; Randall
Mfg. Co, ASBCA No. 5653, 60-1 B.C.A. 2660.
59. ASBCA Nos. 9860, 10531, 9683, 67-1 B.CA. 6165.
60. ASBCA Nos. 9502, 9617, 9793, 10608, 66-2 B.C.A. 5860.
61. See also Maxwell Electronics Corp., ASBCA Nos. 8261, 8443, 63-1 B.C.. 3916 at
19428; Szemco, Inc, ASBCA No. 9892, 65-1 B.C.A. 4535.
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ment increases the contractor's burden beyond the actual specification
requirements.2 In this situation, the contracting officer is not likely
to issue a formal change order, since he believes that he is merely re-
questing compliance with the contract as written. Should his interpre-
tation be incorrect, a constructive change arises. For example, insist-
ence by the Government that a contractor furnish a more expensive-
vacuum tube than that required by the specifications has been deemed
a change order entitling the contractor to compensation under the
Changes clause.63
Still another significant area in which the doctrine can be invoked
concerns rigorous inspection or unjustified rejection by Government
inspectors of contractor end-products or performance. In Lox Equip-
ment Co.,6 the ASBCA determined that excessive cleaning require-
ments by Government inspectors constituted a constructive change.
More importantly, the Board concluded that, although inspectors have
no contractual authority to issue changes,65 in a situation where approval
could not be obtained without compliance with the inspector's orders
and where the contracting officer was aware of the interpretation of
contract standards being employed by the inspector, such inspectors
are deemed to be authorized representatives, and their directives con-
stitute constructive changes.
The final area in which constructive change concepts arise has been
described in the Anti-Claims clause as "requiring adherence to delivery
schedules when a contractor is entitled to a time extension." 66 Such,
action gives rise to a "constructive acceleration" and requires the Gov-
ernment to grant an equitable adjustment.6 7
Notice Requirement for Constructive Changes
The boards of contract appeals generally have held that the 30-day
notice requirement imposed by the Changes clause does not apply to
constructive changes.68 Only when the claim asserted by the contractor
62. Trane Co., ASBCA No. 6663, 61-2 B.C.A. 3258.
63. Hoffman Electronics Corp., ASBCA No. 9811, 65-1 B.C.A. 4680; Vector Mfg.
Co., ASBCA No. 7989, 63-1 B.C.A. 3909.
64. ASBCA No. 8985, 1964 B.C.A. 4463.
65. ASPR 7-103.1 Definitions does not include inspectors among "authorized repre-
sentatives" of the contracting officer, and it is generally held that inspectors are not
authorized to change contract requirements. See, e.g., L. B. Samford, Inc. v. United
States, 410 F.2d 782 (Ct. C1. 1969).
66. Proposed ASPR Revision (Appendix B), Anti-Claims clause.
67. Gibbs Shipyard, Inc., ASBCA No. 9809, 67-2 B.C.A. 6499.
68. This rule is based on the theory that an effective change order is a condition
[Vol. 14:1I62,
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is so untimely as to prejudice the Government's evaluation of it will
the boards uphold disallowance by the contracting officer.69 In one
respect, however, a claim based upon a constructive change order is
governed by the notice requirements of the Changes clause; viz., it must
be asserted prior to final payment.70
The Limitations of the Remedy
Before the doctrine of constructive change can be employed success-
fully, circumstances must demonstrate that the contractor was justified
in acting on the orders or conduct of Government personnel who
were not technically authorized to issue formal change orders. Work
"volunteered" by a contractor will not be the basis for invoking the
doctrine, even if the work was of benefit to the Government.71 This
does not mean, of course, that the contracting officer alone can issue a
constructive change order. As previously indicated, the actions of in-
spectors and certain other administrators and personnel will, in the
proper circumstances, be considered the acts of the contracting officer
and thus give rise to a constructive change.72 Nevertheless, the uncer-
tainty as to who can bind the Government places substantial risk upon
the contractor.
[T]he facts of life in performance of a Government contract
are such that because of factors of emergency, time, distance, or
difficulty of communication, Government officials who are not
techmcally authorized to issue either formal or constructive change
orders . . . do so. Moreover, ordinarily these directions are
backed by common sense and practical necessity and make useful
contributions to the project that the technical people are . . .
precedent to the contractor's obligation to file a claim, and since there is no such
order in a constructive change situation, the contractor is not bound by the provisions
governing formal changes. See, e.g., Crane Carrier Corp, ASBCA No. 9822, 65-2
B.C.A, 4945; Burton-Rodgers, Inc., ASBCA No. 5438, 60-1 B.C.A. 2558.
69. Eggers & Higgins and Edwin A. Keeble Associates, Inc., VACAB No. 537, 66-1
B.C.A. 5525.
70. Missouri Research Laboratories, Inc., ASBCA No. 12355, 69-i B.C.A. 7762.
71. General Bronze Corp. v. Umted States, 338 F.2d 117 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (contracting
officer's letter acknowledging performance beyond contractual requirements and in-
creased costs held not to constitute a change "order" or an acquiesence producing a
constructive change).
72. Hayes International Corp., ASBCA No. 9750, 65-1 B.C.A. 4767; Reeves Instr.
Co., ASBCA No. 11534, 69-2 B.C.A. 7078; Lillard's, ASBCA No. 6630, 61-1 B.C.A.
3053; Inet Power Co., NASABCA No. 566-23, 68-1 B.C.A. 7020.
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happy with, and with which the contracting officer will usually
be satisfied.73
However, the Government may later assert that those who "ordered"
the change had no authority to do so. In this situation, the contractor
may have expended money and effort to the Government's advantage,
and still be unable to recover. One observer suggests that the con-
tractor's solution to this problem is prompt protest or assertion of a
claim to the contracting officer as soon as he identifies any action or
inaction by the Government that he feels is a constructive change. 4
This then places the burden upon the contracting officer, forcing him
to ratify or countermand the change. Also, it removes the possibility
that the contractor subsequently will be deemed to have acted as a
"volunteer." 75
Despite the flood of claims experienced by the Government in the
past decade, the contractor is by no means assured of collecting for
changed work. The contractor must identify constructive changes;
this is not easily accomplished. One difficulty is the constant inter-
face of Government and contractor employees, particularly technical
personnel, in the administration of a Government contract. Another
obstacle is the complexity of modern defense systems which require
far greater care in the preparation of specifications and present an
unlimited number of possible interpretations once they are issued. Con-
tractor employees, uneducated in the vagaries of Government contract
law, may accept a Government interpretation or follow directives as
to methods of performance. This in turn can lead to increased costs
which may not be identifiable as a change for months. This problem
has been placed in perspective by one writer, who said:
• . . It should be kept in mind that a constructive change by its
very nature is not susceptible to ready discovery. If it were,
there would have been no need for the ASBCA to develop the
doctrine-it would have been pointless to protect contractors if
the factors which spell 'constructive change' were readily and in-
stantly recognizable. It is the hallmark of these changes that they
'evolve' over a period of time rather than arising full-blown at a
given instant.76
73. Vom BAUR, CONCElRRAT COURSE IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS J-21 (1970).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., General Bronze Corp. v. United States, 338 F.2d 117 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
76. Letter from the Council of Defense and Space Industry Association to Assistant
Secretary of Defense Shillito, June 28, 1971.
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This identification problem, coupled with the Government's failure
to prevent its employees from issuing change orders,77 and the promi-
nence of technicians in the procurement of modern products, poses
difficult problems for contractors even under the doctrine as it presently
exists.
TIE ANTI-CLAIMS CLAUSE
The policy statement of the proposed Contractor's Identification of
Changes clause (Appendix B) declares that no unilateral changes will be
effected in a contract except for formal changes by the contracting
officer. It further states, however, that the Government recognizes
the existence of the constructive change, and that such changes give
rise to contractor claims. Consequently, "whenever the contractor
considers that the Government has effected a change in the terms or
conditions of the contract that has not been identified as such in writing
and signed by the contracting officer," it is necessary that the Govern-
ment be "advised" as soon as possible. The strictures of this notice
provision permit the Government to evaluate the technical impact and
desirability of the reported changes and to confirm or countermand
the adjustments. The clause is to be employed when the contracting
officer considers it likely that contract performance will give rise to
constructive changes.
The heart of the clause is found in its Notice, Continued Perform-
ance, and Government Response provisions. The contractor is required
to notify the contracting officer in writing within 10 days from the
date he identifies any conduct by the Government which he regards
as a constructive change. The notification requirement is extremely
onerous; the contractor must present a detailed analysis of the alleged
change's past and prospective effects on contract performance, sched-
ule, and cost, in addition to a precise account of the change-causing
order or occurrence. Furthermore, the contractor is required to con-
tinue performance, "notwithstanding that the contractor considers Gov-
ernment conduct to be a change," until directed otherwise by the
contracting officer.
The Government must respond to the contractor's notice within
15 days. The contracting officer may confirm the conduct or counter-
mand it, or he may deny that it constitutes a change. In addition, he
may find that the contractor has not submitted a sufficiently detailed
77. Vom Baur, The Anti-Claims Clauses-The Admission of an Inability to Govern,
BNA FEIERAL CoNTRAcTs REPORT No. 340, p. A-12 (1970).
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report of the change and inform him of other information which is
necessary to make a decision. If the contractor complies with any
communication from a Government representative without first pro-
viding the required notice and without receiving a direction to comply
from the contracting officer, the contractor will have "waived its right
under [the] contract to an equitable adjustment for such Government
conduct."
Finally, in perhaps its most objectionable section, the clause provides
a limitation on recoverable costs, declaring that, even when the conduct
is confirmed as a change, "an equitable adjustment.., shall not include
any increased costs incurred earlier than - days before the con-
tractor submits the notice required. . . ." The clause stipulates that the
blank should be filled with a number not less than the number of days
in which the contractor is allowed to give notice. A 10-day notice
provision is the most common.
Effect on the Constructive Cbage Remedy
Aside from the fact that it is probably unworkable,'7 8 the notice pro-
vision of the clause is far more stringent than notice requirements in
other Government contract clauses. Certainly it is more burdensome
than the 30-day provision in the Standard Supply Contract Changes
clause,79 which, as previously noted, is always waived unless the Gov-
ernment has been prejudiced. The provisions of the proposed change
which shift the greatest risk to the contractor, however, are the Con-
tinued Performance and the Government Response sections. Operating
jointly, these two sections effectively force the contractor to proceed
at his own risk with work he may regard as beyond his contractual
obligation."' If he complies with any instruction of a Government
representative without satisfying the notice requirement and without
a direction from the contracting officer to do so, the Government will
not be liable for increased costs, delay of performance, or contract
non-performance by the contractor. This places the contractor in an
untenable position-he must continue performance, but if he does so it
78. Megyerl, supra note 19, at 14: "Contractors may be forced to issue such notices
after every meeting concerning contract specifications in order to protect their rights.
At the very least, this notice requirement demands constant review by a team of engi-
neers, accountants, and attorneys."
79. ASPR 7-103.2.
'80. Letter from the Council of' Defense and Space Industry Associations, supra
note 76.
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will be at his own risk, because technically he is not authorized to do so. 81
Another burdensome provision of the proposed ASPR change is the
prohibition against any claim for constructive change costs incurred
more than "x" days prior to the date when notice is provided by the
contractor. The original Navy clause set this limit at 20 days.82 Con-
sidering the previously noted difficulty of identifying constructive
changes, the contractor now is placed in an even more tenuous position
with respect to recovering his costs.
It must be noted that the Anti-Claims clause closely resembles the
Standard Construction Contract Changes clause,8s which. also restricts
recoverable costs to those incurred within a stated period prior to
notice (20- days) .84 The Standard clause has been strictly construed
against a contractor who failed to give the requisite written notice of
his claim for a constructive change, even though the Government was
not prejudiced by the late notice s5 However, the Standard clause is
still less onerous than the Anti-Claims clause is intended to be, since it
exempts -defective specifications from the 20-day time limitation on
recoverable costs.86
Enforcing the Clause
Several observers have contended that the Anti-Claims clause is both
unconscionable and unenforceable,8 7 especially in light of the purpose
of the constructive change doctrine as developed by the appeals boards-
to compensate contractors for extra work performed at the direction
of Government administrators without formal written change orders.
It must be remembered that such a situation is, in fact, a technical
breach of contract, and that only the appeal boards' desire to maintain
their jurisdiction and to prevent the unjust enrichment of the Gov-
81. Megyeri, supra note 19, at 1,4. The author concludes that "[t]he obvious intent
of this clause is to give the Government an opportunity to reconsider orders found to
be changes. The risk for costs incurred during the reconsideration is placed upon the
contractor."
82. NPC No. 18 (October 1970).
83. ASPR 7-602.3. This clause specifically recogmzes the constructive change as
does the proposed revision to ASPR.
84. ASPR 7-602.3 (d).
85. Merando, Inc., GSBCA No. 3300, 71-1 B.CA . 8892.
86. ASPR 7-602.3 (d). This could mean that a contractor who attempts to comply
with impossible or defective specifications will be able to recover the cost of the at-
tempt incurred during the ten day period prior to his giving notice and nothing more.
87. FED RAL CoNTsACS REPORT No. 418, A-2 (1972) citing the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Section of Public Contract Law.
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emiment has prevented both the contractor and the Government from
being forced to litigate such cases before the courts. Although the
Anti-Claims clause purports to provide better "control" over construc-
rive changes through the imposition of "management discipline," Is in
reality it will eliminate many meritorious claims and greatly restrict
cost-recovery of claims which do overcome the stringent procedural
requirements. This result is reminiscent of a 1913 Supreme Court de-
cision rendered prior to the development of the constructive change
concept, which held that the absence of a required written change order
precludes any remedy by the contractor."9 Apparently, the Govern-
ment would return to this harsh sixty-year-old rationale.
On the other hand, at least one recent decision by the Eighth Circuit
suggests that there may not be uniform judicial acceptance of the
Anti-Claims clause. In United States v. F. D. Rich Co.,90 the court
refused to interpret "anti-claims" type clauses in a subcontractor's con-
tract. They were found to be a "shield barring legitimate claims for
extra work performed with the knowledge, consent or acquiescence of
the paying party.""' Instead, the court held that in the absence of
proof of prejudice, the subcontractor's failure to follow procedural
requirements (similar to those in the proposed ASPR revision) would
not bar its claim for extra compensation.
In addition, the recent adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
by the Court of Claims as part of the body of law governing public
contracts92 makes possible the argument that the self-contained statute
of limitations on claims and recoverable costs is contrary to the UCC
prohibition against limiting periods of limitation to less than one year.93
CONCLUSION
The basic theory underlying Government procurement can be seen
as the reason for the development of the constructive change doctrine
and, in turn, for the promulgation of the Anti-Claims clause. The
Government has attempted to fit complex, unstable procurements, with
poorly established baselines into contractual arrangements which are
88. FEDERAL CoNmAcrs REPORT No. 367, at A-5 (1971), citing the interpretation of
the clauses purpose by a member of the General Counsel's Office of the Navy De-
partment.
89. Plumley v. United States, 226 U.S. 545 (1913).
90. 439 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1971).
91. Id. at 903.
92. Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d 546 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
93. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725(1).
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better designed for the production of more firmly established hardware.
The complexities of modem defense systems furnish a fertile ground
for the issuance of defective specifications, for varied interpretations
by Government technicians, and for Government interference with
contract performance-all of which, of course, give rise to constructive
changes.
The Government's lack of success in drafting perfect specifications
for use by contractors, together with its inability to prevent unauthorized
actions by its personnel, apparently have prompted a decision to shift
the risk occasioned by this failure to the contractor. Now, not only
is there greater risk associated with contracting with the Government,
but also there is more risk involved during performance. Unfortu-
nately, given the present theory of Government contracting and the
complexity and uncertainty of modern technology, there are few solu-
tions to this problem. Changes in the work invariably will be necessary
so long as the Government insists upon competitive procurement prior
to firmly establishing the technological basis for what it desires the
contractor to build. In a real sense, the problem is managerial rather
than legal.94
Accordingly, one suggested alternative is to abandon the fixed-price
competitive theory (at least until the "bugs" are ironed-out), and to
establish scientific-engineering teams, concurrently funded, which would
develop the technology necessary to produce the hardware desired. 5
The contracts for the end-product then could be let on a competitive
bid basis with a far more stable technological starting point for pro-
duction.
Another method of reducing the technical problems encountered
during performance and, thus, the incidence of constructive changes,
is the "prototype" concept. The use of prototypes "reduces technical
uncertainty at bargain prices.., and makes ... production commit-
ments more realistic and effective." 16
However, so long as the Department of Defense adheres to a fixed-
price contracting policy, shifting technological and specification risk
to the contractor, the constructive change will continue to be a by-
product of military procurement. While it may be desirable to "iden-
tify" such changes as promptly as possible in order to facilitate the
procurement process, it is certainly inequitable to prevent the contractor
94. Government Contractor's Communique No. 72-5, June 1, 1972.
95. Id.
96. Drake, supra note 8, at 137.
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from recovering costs incurred due to Government error, ambiguities
in specifications, misinterpretation of specifications, or the unauthor-
ized acts of Government representatives. Equities aside, the interests
of the Department of Defense may be ill-served when one considers
the low profit margins of the defense contractors 7 and the ever-in-
creasing shift of capital away from Government defense procurement
in recent years.
98
The contractor knows the risk involved in contracting ,with the
Department of Defense. He has employed the constructive change
doctrine to reallocate some of the risk involved-at least that portion
occasioned by the fault or error of the Government. The Anti-Claims
clause seeks to shift that risk back to the contractor through "tough"
contract language. Unfortunately, the result may well be the exclusion
of contractors, especially new and small enterprises, from future gov-
ernment procurements.
APPENDIX A
ASPR 7-103.2 "Changes"
The Contracting Officer may at any time, by a written order, and
without notice to the sureties, make changes, within the general scope
of this contract, in any one or more of the following: (i) Drawings,
designs, or specifications, where the supplies to be furnished are to be
specially manufactured for the Government in accordance therewith;
(ii) method of shipment or packing; and (iii) place of delivery. If any
such change causes an increase or decrease in the cost of, or the time
required for, the performance of any part of the work under this con-
tract, whether changed or not changed by any such order, an equitable
adjustment shall be made in the contract price or delivery schedule,
or both, and the contract shall be modified in writing accordingly. Any
claim by the Contractor for adjustment under this clause must be
asserted within 30 days from the date of receipt by the Contractor of
the notification of change: Provided, however, that the Contracting
Officer, if he decides that the facts justify such action, may receive and
act upon any such claim asserted at any time prior to final payment
under this contract. Where the cost of property made obsolete or
97. See note 7 supra.
98. FEaR. CoNTRACTs REPORT No. 321, at A-13 (1970). The number of manufac-
turers devoting a great portion of their capital to defense contracting is diminishing
steadily.
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excess as a result of a change is included in the Contractor's claim for
.adjustment, the Contracting Officer shall have the right to prescribe the
manner of disposition of such property. Failure to agree to any ad-
justment shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the
meaning of the clause of this contract entitled "Disputes." However,
nothing in this clause shall excuse the Contractor from proceeding with
the work as changed.
APPENDIX B
Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations.
Proposed ASPR Rewzszons
1. Add a new Part 8 to ASPR XXVI.
Part 8-Contractor's Identification of Chinges
26-800 General. No unilateral changes will be made. in the terms or
conditions of a contract except for changes identified as such in writing
and signed by the contracting officer pursuant to the "Changes" clause
or other clause in the contract (see 1-201.1, 26-101 through 26-205).
However, when a contracting officer or other Government represent-
ative by conduct (written or oral communications, actions, or inactions)
requires a contractor to perform work other than as indicated above,
such conduct may be the basis for a claim by the contractor, as if a
formal change had been issued. Examples of such Government conduct
include: prescribing defective or impossible specifications; requiring
adherence to delivery schedules when a contractor is entitled to a time
extension; or denying a contractor the opportunity to employ a per-
missible method or sequence of work.
Whenever a contractor considers that the Government has effected
a. change in the terms and conditions of the contract that has not been
identified as such in writing and signed by the contracting officer, it
is necessary that the Government be advised as soon as possible. This
,,will permit the Government to (1) evaluate the technical impact and
desirability of reported changes, (2) confirm that an act or omission
is a change and direct the mode of further performance, (3) counter-
mand an-alleged change or notify the contractor that no dhange is con-
sidered to have been effected, and (4) plan for the funding of changes.
The clause in 7-104.xx is designed to accomplish these purposes..
4972"]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
26-801 Procedures.
a. Consistent with 26-202, only the Procuring Contracting Officer
(PCO) is authorized to take the actions prescribed in paragraphs (c),
(d), and (e) of the 7-104.xx clause.
b. When the procuring contracting officer anticipates that continuity
of the contractor's performance for a particular phase or task under a
contract is so important that no delay or diminution of performance is
permissible, he may designate a representative authorized to issue direc-
tions and interpretations as provided in the clause contained in 7-104.xx.
In the event such a designation is made, the notice of designation shall:
(1) be in writing and furnished promptly to both the contractor-.and
to the "specifically authorized representative," and (2) clearly prescribe
the scope and duration of authority of the "specifically authorized repre-
sentative." No such notice shall be issued retrospectively to confirm
directions earlier communicated by a representative of the Government.
The Procuring Contracting Officer should promptly countermand any
directions of a "specifically authorized representative" which exceed
his designated authority. A sample of such a designation is:
"I, John Doe, contracting officer, pursuant to (c) (ii) of the
Change Identification clause under Contract NOOOOOO-71-C-0001
hereby designate Ralph Roe, quality assurance representative resi-
dent at the contractor's facility as my representative empowered
to communicate directions, interpretations, determinations or or-
ders concerning qualification test specification No. ABCD dated
6 August 1969 during the forthcoming qualification testing of the
XYZ weapon system between 29 November and 4 December
1973."
26-802 The clause set forth in 7-104.xx may be used when the con-
tracting officer considers that situations will arise that may result in a
contractor alleging that the Government has effected changes other than
those identified as such in writing and signed by the contracting officer.
Generally, the clause set forth in 7-104.xx should not be inserted ini
contracts less than $1,000,000 in price.
7-104.xx Contractor's Identification of Changes. In accordance with
26-802, insert the following clause:
CONTRACTOR'S IDENTIFICATION OF CHANGES
(a) Definitions. As used in this clause, (i) the term "Contracting
Officer" does not include any representative of the Contracting
[Vol. 14:162
ANTI-CLAIMS CLAUSES
Officer whether or not such representative is acting within the
scope of his authority, and (ii) the term "specifically authorized
representative" means any person whom the Contracting Officer
has designated as provided in paragraph (c).
(b) Notice. Except for changes identified as such in writing and
signed by the Contracting Officer, the contractor shall notify the
Contracting Officer in writing within 10* calendar days from the
date that he identifies any conduct (including actions, inactions,
and written or oral communications) by the Government which
he regards as a change to the contract terms and conditions. The
Notice shall state, on the basis of the most accurate information
then available to the contractor:
(i) the date, nature, and circumstances of the conduct re-
garded as a change;
(ii) the name, function, and activity of each Government
individual and contractor official or employee involved in or
knowledgeable about such conduct;
(iii) the identification of any documents and the substance
of any oral communication involved in such conduct;
(iv) in the instance of alleged acceleration of scheduled per-
formance or delivery, the excusable delay upon which it is
based;
(v) the particular elements of contract performance for
which the contractor may seek an equitable adjustment under
this clause, including:
(1) what contract line item(s) have been or may be
affected by the alleged change;
(2) what labor and/or materials have been or may be
added, deleted, or wasted by the alleged change;
(3) to the extent possible, what delay and disruption in
the manner and sequence of performance and effect on
continued performance have been or may be caused by
the alleged change; and
(4) what adjustment to contract price, delivery sched-
ule, and other provisions affected by the alleged change
is estimated; and
* Or such other time as the parties may negotiate.
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(vi) the contractor's estimate of the time by which the Gov-
ernment must respond to the contractor's notice to minimize
delay or disruption of performance.
(c) Continued Performance. Notwithstanding that the contractor
considers'Government conduct to constitute a change, he never-
theless shall diligently continue performance of this contract in
accordance with its terms and conditions to the maximum extent
possible, (i) until he is directed otherwise by the Contracting
Officer, or (ii) unless the alleged change is a communication from
a specifically authorized representative of the Contracting Officer,
in which case the contractor shall comply with such communica-
tion. (If the contractor regards the foregoing direction or com-
munication as a change, notice shall be given as provided in (b).)
For the purposes of this paragraph the term "specifically author-
ized representative" means any person whom the Contracting Offi-
cer has designated by written notice prior to such communication.
Such notice shall refer to this paragraph and a copy thereof shall
be provided to the contractor.
(d) Government Response. The Contracting Officer shall within
15* calendar days respond in writing to the contractor. In such
response the Contracting Officer shall either (i) confirm that the
conduct of which the contractor gave notice constitutes a change
and direct the mode of further performance, (ii) countermand
any communication regarded as a change, (iii) deny that the
conduct of which the contractor gave notive constitutes a change
and direct the mode of further performance, or (iv) in the event
the contractor's notice information is inadequate to make a deci-
sion under (i), (ii), or (iii), advise the contractor what additional
information or time is required.
(e) If the Contracting Officer confirms that the Government
effected a change as alleged by the contractor, an equitable adjust-
ment may be made only in accordance with the contract provi-
sions under which the Contracting Officer could originally have
effected such change, provided that:
(i) If the contractor complies with any communication from
a representative of the Government without first providing
the notice provided above in (b) and without receiving a
direction to comply or denial provided in (c) or (d) or (d)
(iii) above, the contractor shall have waived its right under
Or such other time as the parties may negotiate.
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this contract to an equitable adjustment for such Government
conduct. In this event the Government shall not be liable
for any increased costs, delay of performance, or contract
non-performance by the contractor.
(ii) An equitable adjustment for any confirmed change shall
not include any increased costs incurred earlier than _
days before the contractor submits the notice required by
(b).
NOTE: The phrase "contract price," wherever it appears in the
foregoing clause, may be appropriately modified to apply
to cost reimbursement or incentive type contracts, or to
combinations thereof.
7-204.xx Contractor's Identification of Changes.
26-802, insert the clause prescribed by 7-104.xx.
7-303.xx Contractor's Identification of Changes.
26-802, insert the clause prescribed by 7-104.xx.
7-403.xx Contractor's Identification of Changes.
26-802, insert the clause prescribed by 7-104.xx.
In accordance with
In accordance with
In accordance with
* This figure shall be not less than that used in paragraph (b).
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